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NOTES
MARITIME/CRIMINAL LAW-THE MARITIME EXCEPTION TO
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REQUIREMENT FOR A WARRANT AND
PROBABLE CAUSE-United States v. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S.Ct.

2573 (1983).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The past decade witnessed a dramatic increase in drug smuggling
from the sea. Law enforcement agencies countered by increasing ef
forts to stem the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. I A signif
icant volume of arrests for criminal drug trafficking resulted. 2 The
subsequent prosecution of offenders transferred a portion of the gov
ernment's battle against drug smuggling into the courts. The six fed
eral circuits having coastal territory within their jurisdictions have
split over how broadly federal law enforcement authority may be exer
cised without violating the fourth amendment. 3 Two statutes form the
basis of federal maritime law enforcement authority: 19 U.S.c.
§ 1581(a)4 which allows customs agents to board and inspect vessels s
1. Drug Interdiction on the High Seas, 1978: Hearings on H.R. 10371 and H.R. 10698
before the Subcomm. on the Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 103, 112, 119, 120 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
2. Id. at 103.
3. 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 10.5, at 130 & nn. 239-241 (Supp. 1984);
Note, The Fourth Amendment: Rusting on the High Seas?, 34 MERCER L. REV. 1537, 1538
(1983). The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and partic
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982). The statute provides:
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or vehicle at
any place in the United States or within the customs waters or, as he may be
authorized, within a customs-enforcement area . . . and examine the manifest
and other documents and papers and examine, inspect, and search the vessel or
vehicle and every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board,
and to this end may hail and stop such vessel or vehicle, and use all necessary
force to compel compliance.
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within the customs waters 6 and anywhere in the United States; and 14
U.S.c. § 89(a)7 which allows the United States Coast Guard to en
force United States laws aboard American vessels on the high seas as
well as in American waters. 8 Both statutes grant broad discretion and
power to law enforcement agents in the field. The Supreme Court of
the United States addressed the scope of this authority and the consti
tutionality of § 1581(a) in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez. 9
The Court faced the sole issue of whether the boarding of vessels
for document and safety inspections lO in inland waters!! by customs
Id.
5. Id. 19 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (1982) defines "vessel" as "every description of water craft
or other contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation in water,
but does not include aircraft."
6. 19 U.S.C. § 1401(j) (1982) defines customs waters as a band of waters surrounding
the United States 12 miles wide measured from the actual coast, or its equivalent baseline
as defined in the statute, to an imaginary line 12 miles directly off the coast. Id.
7. 14 U.S.c. § 89(a)(1982). The statute provides authority for the Coast Guard to:
make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the
high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction, for the preven
tion, detection, and supression of violations of laws of the United States. For
such purposes, [Coast Guard] commissioned, warrant, and petty officers may at
any time go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation
of any law, of the United States, address inquiries to those on board, . . . ex
amine, inspect, and search the vessel and use all necessary force to compel
compliance.
Id.
8. Id. International law recognizes four types of waters subject to varying degrees of
control by sovereigns: inland waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, and the high
seas. A sovereign completely controls its internal waters as it does a highway on land.
Foreign vessels gain increased rights in each set of waters moving seaward with a corre
sponding decrease in the control of the sovereign. See generally 33 C.F.R. §§ 2.01-1 to
2.10-10 (1983); 19 U.S.C. § 1401(j)(1982); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122-23
(1923); Carmichael, At Sea with the Fourth Amendment. 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 51, 56-58
(1977). Originally the contiguous zone extended only 12 miles out from the coast contain
ing both the territorial sea and the customs waters. See Convention on the High Seas,
opened for signature April 29, 1958, Art. 5, 13 U.S. T. 2313, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 83. Now, the United States, along with many coastal nations, has adopted laws
to extend control of fisheries and resources out 200 nautical miles from the coast. 16
U.S.c. § 1811 (1982). See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82 (1982).
9. 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983).
10. All United States vessels with propulsion machinery are required either to carry
federal documentation or to have a state issued certificate of number. 46 U.S.c. §§ 1466
67, 1469(a) and 1470 (1982); 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-309 (West Supp. 1983). See Vi/
lamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580-81. Generally, a document and safety inspection does
not permit an overall search of a vessel. The inspection is limited to the cabin and area
where documents are kept, the compartment where the beam number of the vessel can be
verified, and the places where safety equipment is required. For a discussion of the permis
sible scope of document and safety inspections see 3 LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 1O.8(f), at
157-59. See also infra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
11. See supra notes 6 & 7.
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officers l2 under authority of § 1581(a),13 without any SusplClOn of
wrongdoing is "reasonable" under the fourth amendment. 14 The
Court reversed the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
holding that such boardings are permitted by the fourth amendment. IS
This note focuses first, on showing that the unique circumstances
of the maritime environment, combined with the historical back
ground of § 1581(a),16 justify the Court's decision in ViI/amante-Mar
quez; I7 and second, on considering its prospective ramifications.
Although the fourth amendment generally requires both a finding of
probable cause and a warrant for a search to be reasonable,18 a very
limited number of narrow exceptions to these requirements exists. 19
The warrantless and suspicionless boarding and inspection of a vessel
in an inland waterway, however, does not fit precisely within anyone
of these previously identified "specifically established and well deline
ated exceptions"2o to the requirements for a warrant and probable
cause. 21 The Court in Vii/amante-Marquez developed a separate mari
12. Coast Guard officers are also "customs officers" under 19 U.S.c. § 1401(i) (1982)
and 19 U.S.c. § 1709(b) (1982). Coast Guard officers, when enforcing a law, are deemed to
be agents of the establishment responsible for administering that law. 14 U.S.c. § 89(b)
(1982).
13. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982).
14. Villamonte-Marquez, \03 S. Ct. at 2575, 2577 n.3 (1983). The Court, however,
rejected a significant moot ness question in order to reach the issue of the validity of 19
U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982). Id. at 2575-76 n.2. See also id. at 2582-84 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
15. Villa monte-Marquez, \03 S. Ct. at 2582.
16. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982).
17. Villamonte-Marquez, \03 S. Ct. at 2578-79 & n.4. The Court's use of historical
background is consistent with previous Supreme Court decisions giving great weight to
statutes passed by the First Congress. See infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The generally recognized excep
tions to the requirements for a warrant or for probable cause or for both are the "stop and
frisk" doctrine from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), exigent circumstances, Michigan v.
Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), the "border search" doctrine, United States v. Ramsey, 431
U.S. 606, 616-22 (1977), administrative inspections, Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594
(1981), the "plain view" doctrine, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971),
searches incident to a valid arrest, Chime1 v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), and consent,
Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). See generally 2 & 3 LAFAvE supra note
2.
20. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
21. The lack of a precise fit into previous exceptions and the ruling of Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661-63 (1978), caused uncertainty and the split of opinion in the
Courts of Appeal because after Prouse there were two possible results in the Villamonte
Marquez situation. Either the maritime environment factors would permit the broad dis
cretion granted under the wording of 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982), or the land-based ration
ale of Prouse would prohibit suspicion less boardings and require that officers have at least a
"reasonable suspicion" of a law violation or that the vessel came from the customs waters.
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time exception 22 which met the balancing test of fourth amendment
reasonableness by a combination of the administrative inspection ra
tionale 23 and the border search doctrine,24 applied to the unique cir
cumstances of the maritime environment. 25 The combination of two
usually distinct rationales for warrantless searches logically created a
resulting whole greater than either of the parts: 26 the maritime excep
tion granted broader authority than either the administrative inspec
tion rationale or the border search doctrine alone.
II.

FACTS

On March 6, 1980, customs officer Wilkins, accompanied by a
Louisiana state police officer, boarded the sailboat HENRY MOR
GAN II under authority of 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a)27 to inspect the ves
sel's documentation. 28 The HENRY MORGAN II was anchored in
the Calcasieu River Ship Channel, a north-south waterway connecting
the Gulf of Mexico with Lake Charles, Louisiana. 29 Customs Patrol
Officer Wilkins had received some information provided by a reliable
informant concerning possible drug smuggling by foreign vessels in the
area. 30 Although he suspected that the sailboat was foreign,31 he had
neither probable cause nor a reasonable suspicion of a law violation
before boarding the vessel. 32 Once aboard, the officer smelled burning
marijuana and observed bales of marijuana through an open hatch. 33
See 3 LAFAVE supra note 2, § 1O.8(f), at 159-60. Additionally, the result of Villamante
Marquez was not readily foreseeable. See id. at 160-6\.
22. 103 S. Ct. at 2582. See alsa United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1306-07
(5th Cir. 1979) (recognizing effect of the distinct maritime environment), cert. denied 448
U.S. 906 (1980).
23. See infra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
25. Villamante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2582; United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d
1303, 1311-16 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980); United States V. Freeman,
579 F.2d 942, 946 (1978).
26. GREAT TREASURY OF WESTERN THOUGHT § 17-12 (M. Adler & C. Van Doren
eds. 1977) (quoting EUCLID, ELEMENTS I, COMMON NOTIONS).
27. 19 U.S.c. § 1981(a) (1982).
28. Villamante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2576-77 (1983).
29. Id.
30. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 652 F.2d 481, 482-83 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd
103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983). The informant could neither describe the vessels, nor give their
exact locations. Id.
31. Officer Wilkens felt that the vessel was foreign because the person on board did
not appear to understand English and the homeport "Basilea," painted on the vessel, was
not known to be an American port. The occupant subsequently produced foreign papers
during the document inspection. Id.
32. Villamante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2576-77 (1983).
33. Id..
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Officer Wilkins then arrested the two men on board, respondents Vil
lamonte-Marquez and Hamparian. A subsequent search revealed ap
proximately 5,800 pounds of marijuana. 34
A jury found the
defendants guilty of various charges relating to possession and impor
tation of marijuana with intent to distribute. 35 The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding the boarding of the HENRY
MORGAN II "not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment" be
cause the officers boarded without a reasonable suspicion of a law vio
lation. 36 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a six to three
decision, held that because of the special circumstances of the mari
time environment and the lack of practical alternatives, the customs
officers' actions were reasonable and, therefore, did not violate the
fourth amendment. 37
III.

ANALYSIS

The administrative boarding of the vessel clearly fell within the
authority of§ 1581(a).38 The "plain view" doctrine justified the subse
quent search. 39 The only question remaining was whether the suspi
cionless boarding of a vessel in inland waters for a document and
safety inspection met the criteria for an exception to the warrant and
probable cause requirements of the fourth amendment. 40
A.

The Administrative Inspection Rationale
1.

Historical Basis of § 1581(a)41

Authority to search for stolen goods, contraband, or goods hid
den to avoid paying customs duties has historically been considered in
a different light than searches for private papers when the person, ve
hicle, or vessel is reasonably suspected of having crossed the border.42
34. Id..
35. Id. at 2577. The defendants were found guilty of violating the following statutes:
21 U.S.c. § 963 (1982) (conspiracy to import marijuana); 21 U.S.c. § 952(a) (1982) (im
portation of marijuana); 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982) (conspiracy to possess marijuana with in
tent to distribute); and 21 U.S.C. § 841(1)(a) (1982) (possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute). Vii/amante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2577.
36. United States v. ViIIamonte-Marquez, 652 F.2d 481, 488 (1981), rev'd 103 S. Ct.
2573 (1983).
37. Vii/amante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2582.
38. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982). See ViI/amante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2578.
39. Villamante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2577 n.3.
40. Id. at 2578.
41. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982). See supra note 4 for the text of § 1581(a).
42. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606,617-20 (1977). Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886). An early customs statute exempted searches of vessels for goods
concealed to avoid duties from a warrant requirement while dwellings and buildings on
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Also, the search of moving vehicles or vessels for goods subject to for
feiture has been recognized as a valid exception to the requirement for
a warrant because of exigent circumstances. 43 Consequently, because
of the inherent mobility of ships and the prospective haven of the open
sea,44 no serious contention exists that warrants should be required in
order to board vessels for a document inspection under authority of
§ 1581(a).45 To require a warrant under these circumstances would
only result in a "formalistic exercise."46 Entirely different and more
difficult issues, however, involve how far inland these boardings may
be conducted and the validity of the authority to board without prob
able cause.
The customs officers' authority to conduct warrantless inspec
tions and searches stems from the first customs statute. 47 The First
Congress enacted this statute only two months before it proposed the
Bill of Rights containing the fourth amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The statute's historical back
ground, therefore, provides a strong indication that the First Congress
did not consider such searches unreasonable. 48 It then passed the di
rect lineal ancestor of § 1581(a) to enforce these customs laws. 49 The
language of the statute has remained largely unchanged. 50 What was
land could only be searched in the daytime and only with a warrant. Act of Aug. 4, 1790,
ch. 35, § 48, I Stat. 170 (repealed 1799). The present-day parallel provision for customs
searches of buildings, 19 U.S.c. § 1595 (1982), remains distinct from 19 U.S.c. § 1581
(1982).
43. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
44. Vii/amante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580 (1983).
45. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982). See Vii/amante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580; United
States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 842 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303,
1306-07 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980).
46. United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 842 (1st Cir. 1980).
47. Act of July 31,1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29 (repealed 1790).
48. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1977) (reaffirming Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886». The Ramsey Court also reaffirmed the rule of
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925): "The Fourth Amendment is to be con
strued in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was
adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and
rights of individual citizens." Ramsey, 413 U.S. at 616-19 & n.14 (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S.
at 149).
49. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982). The early statute was the Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch.
35, § 31, 1 Stat. 164 (repealed 1799).
50. Compare Act of Aug. 4,1790, ch. 35, § 31,1 Stat. 164 (repealed 1799) with 19
U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982). Before 1922, there was a limitation to boarding vessels in the
customs waters "if bound to the United States." Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat.
164 (repealed 1799). See Vii/amante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2578 n.4, and id. at 2586 n.7
(Brennan, J., dissenting). But see United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1310 & nn.8 &
9 (5th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980). Although section 48 of the Act of Aug.
4, 1790, ch. 35, 1 Stat 170 (repealed 1799) contained the wording "reason to suspect," § 31
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considered reasonable at the time the fourth amendment was adopted
receives great weight in applying the fourth amendment today.51 The
early cases concerning boarding and search of vessels support this his
torical construction by implication since the courts apparently as
sumed the constitutionality of the boarding: the controversy usually
concerned whether the government had sufficient justification to
seize 52 the vessel and its cargo. 53
By enacting the first customs statute 54 and its first modification, 55
Congress established a system of documentation for all sizeable Amer
ican vessels and also regulated their movement in trade and fishing. 56
Congress revised and expanded the system in 1793: 57 the same basic
framework remains today. 58 The regulations have become even more
pervasive throughout the maritime industry for nearly all vessels of
any type, whether used commercially or for pleasure. 59 Recreational
boats can also be used commercially: inspection of the documents pro
vides the only viable method of distinguishing pleasure vessels from
commercial. 60 Additionally, pleasure vessels are usually not required
to clear customs so the document inspection provides the only means
of verifying that a vessel is not avoiding customs duties by posing as a
did not. Act of Aug. 4,1790, ch. 35, § 31, I Stat. 164 (repealed 1799). Section 31 had only
a possible limitation to vessels hound for the United States. The differences do not affect
the authority for suspicionless hoardings because the two sections are separate and indepen
dently enforceable. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2578 n.4.
51. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1977). See supra note 48.
52. Although for fourth amendment analysis the hoardings are "seizures," United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975), the use of the word "seizure" in the
maritime context connotes a legal taking of the vessel rather than a brief detention,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1219 (5th ed. 1979), because of the frequent exercise of in rem
jurisdiction in admiralty law. See also 19 U.S.c. § 1594 (1982). For purposes of this note,
therefore, the hoardings will be referred to either as an inspection or a detention.
53. See Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 503-04 (1927); id. at 524 (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (expressing view that there was "no limitation upon the right of the sovereign
to seize without a warrant vessels registered under its laws"); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S.
559, 563 (1927). For an excellent review of the early law of at sea searches and Coast
Guard jurisdiction, see Carmichael, supra note 8, at 55-59 (1977).
54. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29 (repealed 1790).
55. Act of Sept. I, 1789, ch. II, § 22, I Stat. 60 (repealed 1792).
56. Id. American vessels over 20 tons were required to enroll and be licensed. Id. at
60-61. Vessels over 5 tons were required to be licensed. Id. at 61. Owners of domestic
vessels were to paint the name and home port on the stern. Id. at 56.
57. Act of Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 8, I Stat. 305 (repealed \799).
58. Brief of the United States at 17, Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2573.
59. Id. at 37-38. See e.g. 16 U.S.c. § 1861(b) (1982) (fishing); 46 U.S.C.A. § 3701-18
(West Supp. 1983) (tankers); 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 12106-109 (West Supp. 1983) (activity en
gaged in). Customs document regulations specifically directed at foreign vessels apply
while they navigate in United States waters. See e.g. 19 U.S.c. §§ 1431-1460 (1982).
60. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580-81 & nn. 5-6 (1983).
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pleasure vessel. 61 The term "maritime industry" would perhaps be
more appropriately labeled "a narrow area of regulatory concern"
rather than an "industry." The comprehensive nature of the federal
documentation and safety regulations for American vessels, however,
does meet the description of a pervasively regulated industry, provid
ing the basis of the administrative inspection exception to the require
ments for a warrant and probable cause. 62
2.

Validity of Warrantless Administrative Inspections Based
on Less than Probable Cause.

Beginning with Camara v. Municipal Court,63 the Supreme Court
held that a lesser standard existed for administrative inspections in
pervasively regulated industries than the "probable cause" standard
used in criminal cases, provided that valid statutory authority for the
inspections existed. 64 When the legislature determined that a valid
government interest justified the need for inspections in a pervasively
regulated industry, it could then substitute reasonable legislative stan
dards. 65 Gradually but reluctantly66 the Court permitted inspections
without a warrant. 67 The Court also considered whether obtaining a
warrant would provide any additional notice or protection to the per
son being inspected, and whether it would create an unnecessary bur
den on the inspecting officials in view of the "implied consent" of
persons engaged in an industry subject to pervasive regulation. 68
In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,69 the Court rejected a warrantless
inspection program based on the "implied consent" theory apparently
because the program covered a large cross-section of many businesses
rather than a narrowly defined area needing special requirements and
regulations. 70 The Court distinguished Barlow's in Donovan v.
Dewey,? 1 which established the current standard for deciding the va
lidity of a warrantless inspection under the administrative inspection
46 U.S.C. § 104 (1982); 46 U.S.C.A. § 12109 (West Supp. 1983). See infra notes
and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying notes 71-73.
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
Id. at 534-35.
65. Id. at 538-39. See Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978).
66. Camara, 387 U.S. at 532-33 (retaining warrant requirement).
67. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp.
v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75-77 (1970).
68. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972); see Colonnade Catering
Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75-77 (1970).
69. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
70. Id. at 313-15.
71. 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
61.
100-102
62.
63.
64.
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rationale.72 The Court in Dewey outlined three criteria for a warrant
less inspection without probable cause:
(1) Congress must reasonably determine that warrantless searches
are necessary to further a regulatory scheme;
(2) the federal regulatory presence must be sufficiently compre
hensive and defined, such that
(3) persons engaged in that industry cannot help but be aware
that their property will be subject to inspections undertaken for spe
cific purposes. 73
The facts of Villamonte-Marquez met the criteria:
(1) Congress determined that warrantless searches were necessary
to further the regulatory scheme by enacting § 1581(a),74 and the cir
cumstances of the maritime environment made this determination
reasonable·,75
(2) historically pervasive documentation and safety regulation for
vessels exists in the maritime industry,76 such that
(3) persons who operated vessels with American registration or in
American waters reasonably knew that their documentation was sub
ject to surprise inspection by the customs and the Coast Guard. 77
The defendants in Villamonte-Marquez and in other courts of ap
peals cases raised the argument that customs or Coast Guard officers
boarded the vessel under a pretext of making the document and safety
inspections when their actual purpose encompassed searching for il
licit drugs, thereby tainting the boarding. 78 This argument failed to
recognize that customs enforcement cannot be readily separated from
other documentation enforcement concerns without destroying the
whole maritime documentation and regulatory system. 79 Further
72. Id. at 598-606. See also 3 LAFAVE, supra note 2. § 10.2.
73. See Dewey, 452 U.S. at 600-03.
74. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982).
75. See Vii/amante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2582.
76. See supra notes 35 & 40-45 and accompanying text; United States v. Ramsey, 431
U.S. 606,616-17 (1977).
77. 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-122 (West Supp. 1983). See C. CHAPMAN, PILOTING,
SEAMANSHIP AND SMALL BOAT HANDLING 34, 587, 598 (1971). Considering the extent of
the regulations in the maritime area, a ship or boat owner "cannot help but be aware that
his property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes."
Dewey, 452 U.S. at 600. The Mine Safety and Health Act required inspection of all mines,
and defined the frequency of inspection, and the standards for inspections were set forth in
Title 30 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Id. at 604-05.
78. See Brief for the Respondents at 12-14, Vil/amante·Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573;
United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 845-846 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Watson, 678
F.2d 765, 769-71 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 451 (1983).
79. See United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1065 (5th Cir. 1978) cert. denied.
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more, following the pretext theory would produce the nonsensical re
sult of subjecting only law-abiding persons to the intrusion of the
inspection while granting greater rights to suspected offenders. 80 If
the criteria for conducting an inspection were valid when the officers
have no suspicion at all, then their suspicion of a criminal offense
should not invalidate the inspection because there was no greater in
trusion. If suspicions exist, however tenuous, of a violation of the stat
utory scheme, there would be all the more reason to conduct the
inspection. 81 As long as the inspection meets the statutorily author
ized criteria, the inspection fulfills the fourth amendment's "reasona
bleness" requirement. 82 The crux of the matter revolves around
whether the concerns of the statutory scheme encompass suspicion of
drug smuggling. Since foreign vessels are required to meet documen
tation requirements under customs statutes,83 determination of a ves
sel's nationality falls within the ambit of the statutory scheme.
Importing a cargo of contraband remains a commercial activity. Vi/
lamonte-Marquez involved first, a vessel possibly carrying cargo with
out being licensed for commercial activity84 and second,· its
prospective avoidance of reporting to customs and paying customs du
ties. Both of these concerns are valid documentation considerations.
446 U.S. 956 (1981); United States v. Espinosa-Cerpa, 630 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1980). The
Court in Vil/amonte-Marquez rejected the "pretext" argument. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103
S. Ct. at 2577 n.3.
80. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2577 n.3 (1983); United States v. Watson, 678
F.2d 765, 769-71 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 451 (1982); United States v. Arra,
630 F.2d 836, 846 (1st Cir. 1980).
81. In Vil/amonte-Marquez the Supreme Court limited its decision to the narrow
issue of whether a document inspection could be conducted without any suspicion of
wrongdoing at all. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct at 2575 & n.2. Information from a
reliable informant, however, created a suspicion that a vessel in the area was a foreign
vessel attempting to smuggle illegal drugs. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 652 F.2d
481,482-83 (1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983). The regulatory scheme encompasses such
concerns. See infra notes 63a-63c and accompanying text. Foreign vessels may only transit
United States waters with appropriate documentation, 46 U.S.C. §§ 104, 313-15 (1982),
and are subject to inspection while in the customs waters. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982). The
customs laws require manifests and proper licenses for various activities and provide en
forcement authority and penalty provisions. See generally 19 U.S.c. §§ 1581-1626 (1982).
82. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2577 n.3; United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836,
846 (1st Cir. 1980); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 135-39 (1978) (objective assess
ment of officers conduct appropriate for fourth amendment analysis). The courts of ap
peals have uniformly followed Scott in rejecting the "pretext" argument. Reply Brief for
the United States at 2, Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573.
83. 19 U.S.c. § 1431 (1982). Some licensed yachts may not have to clear customs
and carry a manifest but they are prohibited from carrying either merchandise or passen
gers for pay and their status may be verified by inspection of their documents. See 46
U.S.C. § 104 (1982); 46 U.S.C.A. § 12109 (West Supp. 1983).
84. See 19 U.S.c. §§ 1431-1460, 1584 (1982).
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Furthermore, since illegal commercial or income producing activities
enjoy no special status in federal tax law, 85 logical consistency requires
no advantage be accorded to importation of contraband.
Yet, because "no act of Congress can authorize a violation of the
constitution,"86 room still exists to question the validity of the broad
scope of authority given to field officers under the statute. The amount
of discretion granted by the clear wording of § 1581(a)87 is greater
than ever recognized under the administrative inspection rationale. 88
Section 1581(a) authorized customs officers to search any vessel at any
time. The Court's concern in Barlow's, that persons would be subject
to the "unbridled discretion" of law enforcement officers,89 weighed
against the legitimate need for document inspection in the maritime
environment rendering the balancing test extremely close. Further
more, the ruling of Delaware v. Prouse 90 apparently favored tipping
the scales against the validity of the document and safety inspections if
the inspections were supported only by the administrative inspection
rationale. 91 Similar to Villamonte-Marquez in that pervasive regula
tion existed, Prouse differs because it involved the stop of a motor vehi
cle on land where roads are clearly defined, and because it did not
85. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961) (embezzled money considered as
income). As in the area of federal income tax, the law should properly be amoral for vessel
inspections and licensing. Whether a vessel is foreign or domestic has no real bearing on
the authority to board and check a vessel's status; it need only be in the United States or
within the customs waters. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982). Congress requires American ves
sels to be properly licensed and foreign vessels to clear customs and have a manifest if
carrying a cargo. See supra notes 62a-63b. Whether a vessel is used exclusively for plea
sure or carrying a cargo, contraband or not, if it is traveling within the customs waters then
it is subject to licensing requirements and customs inspections. 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-309
(West Supp. 1983); 46 U.S.C. §§ 104,313-15 (1982). See generally 19 U.S.C. §§ 1581-1626
(1982). Logically then, under the regulatory scheme, officers may determine, by document
inspection, if what appears to be a pleasure vessel is carrying a cargo, and if so, whether the
vessel is properly licensed to do so.
86. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973). See also Vi/
lamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2578.
87. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982). For the text of the statute see supra note 3.
88. See, e.g., Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603-05 (forcible entry prohibited and discretion of
government officials limited); Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 313-15 (OSHA inspection program re
jected because of "unbridled discretion" given to field officers); United States v. Biswell,
406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972) (limited to specific commercial establishments in a narrowly
defined industry); Colonade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75-77 (1970)
(limited to specific commercial establishments in a narrowly defined industry); Camara,
387 U.S. at 532-33 (requiring warrants). See also Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2585
n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 323.
90. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
91. Id. at 661-63. See also 3 LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 1O.8(f) at 160-61.
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occur near the border. 92
B.

Border Search Doctrine

The applicability of the border search doctrine to Villamonte
Marquez was also at issue because of the proximity of the Calcasieu
ship channel to the border,93 and because of the broad language of
§ 1581(a), which authorized inspections not only at the ocean border,
but also nine miles beyond the border and anywhere within the United
States. 94 The border search doctrine states that at the border or its
functional equivalent,95 law enforcement officers may detain and
search without either probable cause or a "reasonable suspicion" of a
law violation. 96
Border searches are not justified by exigent circumstances, but
instead are "reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at
the border."97 In land-based cases, the doctrine is strictly limited to
the border or its functional equivalent. 98 The Supreme Court has
found warrantless stops by a checkpoint operation on less than prob
able cause valid if held for a sufficiently limited and legitimate pur
pose. 99 Despite the broad authority of § 1581(a)IOO the fourth
amendment would invalidate a comparable intrusion if applied to a
vehicle stopped on land away from the border. WI
In Villamonte-Marquez, the vessel was not located at the border.
It was anchored in the ship channel, not at the port of Lake Charles,
the designated customs port of entry which might be considered a
92. Vii/a monte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2579-80.
93. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982).
94. Id. For the text of 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982) and a discussion of the included
waters see supra notes 3, 5, and 7. The end of the territorial sea is the actual border and the
customs waters extend nine miles beyond that line. United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d
.
1303, 1307 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980).
95. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973). A functional
equivalent of the border can be, for example, an airport receiving international nonstop
flights, or an established checkpoint station near the border at a point marking the conflu
ence of two roads extending from the border. Id at 273.
96. Id. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618-22 (1977).
97. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977).
98. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266,273-75 (1973).
99. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-62 (1976); See also Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1979) (recognizing the validity of warrantless stops at a
checkpoint operation).
100. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982).
101. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658-63; Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at
2579.
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functional equivalent of the border. 102 The ocean border consists of an
imaginary line on the sea,103 and ships are highly mobile and capable
of crossing rapidly at any point. 104 Similar factors in a land-based set
ting, however, have been held insufficient to justify general application
of the border search doctrine away from the border. lOS The Vi/
lamonte-Marquez maritime exception, therefore, does not fit clearly
within any previous line of cases holding warrantless searches to be
valid without probable cause. 106 Since a fourth amendment intrusion
existed without clear precedent to follow, the balancing test used by
the Court in Prouse 107 must be applied to the individual circumstances
to determine the constitutionality of the government intrusion.
C.

Determining the "Reasonableness" of Random Boardings for
Document and Safety Inspections.

The Villamonte-Marquez maritime exception fits best into the ad
ministrative inspection rationale,108 yet Prouse, an analogous land
based case, held similar governmental action unconstitutional. 109
Prouse held that when government agents act within an exception to
the warrant requirement, I 10 the fourth amendment issue rests on bal
ancing the intrusion on the individual's fourth amendment rights
against legitimate government interests. I I I Only the unique circum
stances of the maritime environment coupled with the sailboat's prox
imity to the literally liquid ocean border distinguish Villamonte
Marquez from Prouse. 112 Accordingly, the best way to analyze the
102. 103 S. Ct. at 2576, 2579 (1983).
103. United States v. Freeman, 579 F.2d 942, 946 (5th Cir. 1978).
104. United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1314-15 (5th Cir. 1979), cerro denied,
448 U.S. 906 (1980).
105. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879-84 (1975).
106. The discretion granted in Vil/amonte-Marquez is greater than that recognized in
any previous administrative inspection case, including Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594.
See supra note 64. In land-based cases, the border search doctrine does not apply away
from the border. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661-63. Also the "stop and frisk" doc
trine, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), does not normally apply since usually no compara
ble danger of concealed weapons to threaten the apprehending ship exists, absent a war or
other highly unusual circumstances.
107. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654.
108. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
109. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.
110. The boarding of vessels in most circumstances will be within a valid exception
to the requirement for a warrant. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
III. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654.
112. See Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2582; United States v. Whitmire, 595
F.2d 1303, 1307 (5th Cir. 1979) (the true border is an imaginary line three miles offshore),
cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980).
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Vil/amonte-Marquez holding is by comparing it to the Prouse decision
to see whether factors exist in the maritime context which outweigh
the fourth amendment concerns expressed by the Court in Prouse.
Such an analysis reveals that the only concerns which invalidated the
random stop of the automobile in Prouse were the availability of prac
tical and effective alternatives to the action taken, the expectation of
privacy that an individual has in his automobile, and the inapplicabil
ity of the border search doctrine. 113

1.

The Lack of Practical Alternatives

Along the coast of the United States, at the edge of the territorial
sea, the border consists of an imaginary line which cannot be marked
by a physical barrier. The short twelve mile band of ocean over which
the United States exercises general customs enforcement jurisdiction
can be traversed rapidly anywhere along thousands of miles of coast
line. I 14 Additionally, outward appearance rarely alone indicates
whether a vessel came from a foreign port or the high seas, or if it had
contact with a foreign vessel. II5 So it would be extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to stop and inspect vessels at the border, 116 and no
place exists that could practically serve as a functional equivalent of
the border. While vessels eventually may enter inland waters where
traffic could be funneled through a checkpoint, such a system would
be ineffective. I 17 The increased danger of collisions and groundings to
the majority of law-abiding ships and crews would also make such a
practice foolish and costly as well as ineffective. I IS
Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580; Prouse, 440 U.S. at 655-63.
114. See United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1314-15 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980); United States v. Freeman, 579 F.2d 942,946 (5th Cir. 1978).
115. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2581 n.6 (1983); United States v. Whitmire,
595 F.2d 1303, 1314-15 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980).
116. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
117. No equivalents to roads for checkpoints exist until ships are well inside the
border of the territorial sea. See United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1315 (5th Cir.
1979), cert denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980). Vessels can easily discharge illegal cargo any
where along thousands of miles of coastline and they need not return to port for extended
periods. See Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580. Furthermore, smugglers are gener
ally well equipped. See International Narcotics Trafficking: Hearings Before the Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Government Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 455. (1981) (statement of Senator Howard w. Cannon). The location of checkpoints
would not be a surprise for long and could easily be avoided.
118. A "roadblock" in a major ship channel would be somewhat hazardous at the
best of times, and highly dangerous with heavy traffic and large ships. See A. KNIGHT,
MODERN SEAMANSHIP § 9.20 (15 ed. 1977). Large ships are difficult to stop and, in re
stricted waters, must stay within a narrow channel or run aground. Id. Even small vessels
are constantly affected by wind, tide and current and cannot merely park by the side of the
113.
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Distinctions based either on the nationality of a vessel or its use
would be impractical. Visual observation alone rarely provides
enough information to determine either a vessel's nationality or its op
erational status. 1 19 The United States has valid interests both in regu
lating the movement of foreign vessels in United States waters and in
enforcing the customs laws. Identification of vessels is necessary to
achieve those -objectives. 120 Inspection of vessels at the dock does not
present a viable alternative either. Ships with illegal cargoes may off
load smuggled goods or contraband long before tying up at a pier, and
smaller vessels often remove their safety equipment when moored to
prevent theft. 12l
The avoidance of customs laws, albeit of great importance, is only
one of the underlying concerns in the maritime regulatory scheme.
The scheme also encompasses vessel safety, traffic management, and
pollution control which must be enforced within all United States wa
ters, not just at the border. 122 Boardings to enforce these regulations
are necessary because vessels have no license plates, and ships' mark
ings do not provide the majority of the information contained in the
ship's documents. 123 Nor is all safety equipment likely to be visible
from another ship. A license plate system, although theoretically pos
sible, would be expensive to initiate and maintain, and would discour
road in safety. C. CHAPMAN, supra note 77 at 402-05. Most vessels would have to anchor
if there were any delay at all, and this operation itself is time consuming and not without
danger for larger vessels. See KNIGHT at §§ 5.8-5.10; CHAPMAN at 89-112. The combina
tion of danger and ineffectiveness make such a practice impractical. To attempt a road
block in the territorial sea or the customs waters would have similar problems. It would
interfere with the normal flow of traffic, increasing the danger of collision, could be easily
avoided, see supra note 89, and, to people aboard a ship, would look no different from a
random stop. See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
119. See Vii/amante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580.
120. Id. at 2580-81. See also United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1314 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations . . .") is the source of Congress's power to enforce the
customs laws and expresses a legitimate interest of the government.
121. United States v. Piner, 608 F.2d 358, 359-60 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Vil
lamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580.
122. Vii/amante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2581. See also supra notes 49 & 54-59 and
accompanying text.
123. ViI/amante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580, 2581 & n.6. Depending on whether a
vessel is federally documented, or state documented, or has no propulsion machinery, it
may have a federal beam number, an exterior state issued number, or no markings at all.
46 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12309 (West Supp. 1983). Vii/amante-Marquez is therefore distin
guishable from Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, because there is no license plate system available to
provide easy access to the necessary information. Vii/amante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580.
Vessels' exterior markings do not provide sufficient data. Nor are ships subject to an inter
national marking system as are airplanes. Instead, each country specifies its own marking
requirements. Id.
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age foreign commerce. Additionally, a license plate system could not
realistically be enforced even against United States vessels because
they may stay away from American ports for years.
Formulating an effective system of regulation properly rests with
the legislature. Congress enacted the current system authorizing
boardings for document and safety inspection. As long as the legisla
ture chooses a constitutional method, the availability of less intrusive
means does not make a search or inspection unreasonable. 124 Addi
tionally, in considering the validity of a fourth amendment intrusion,
the Court has a duty to be equally concerned with upholding proper
constitutional actions of law enforcement officers as well as protecting
an individual's rights. 125 Vil/amonte-Marquez, then, is distinguishable
from Prouse: The lack of practical alternatives to boardings, because of
the maritime environment, properly received strong weight in the
Court's decision. 126
2.

The Diminished Expectation of Privacy in a Vessel

The individual's reasonable expectation of privacy provides one
key element in balancing an individual's fourth amendment interest
against the amount of government intrusion permitted. 127 In Vi/
lamonte-Marquez, the balance turned on three determinations: first,
whether vessels were inherently different in their use so as to have a
lesser privacy interest than family cars; second, whether there was an
unreasonable intrusion into a protected area, considering what areas
124. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973). Not since the Lochner era,
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), has the Supreme Court engaged in substantive
due process analysis in considering economic choices of the legislature. See G. GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 517-18, 533-44 (10th ed. 1980). Substantive due process will be
applied only where a Constitutionally protected individual right has been affected. See id.
at 541-44. Here, although the fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches is implicated, protection from a valid administrative inspection extends only to
places in which a person has both a subjective and an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). In a
ship, only the private areas of the crew's quarters would qualify. See infra note 139. The
government has a legitimate interest in inspecting the documents and safety equipment.
Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2581. It would make little sense to expend great
amounts for little, if any, improvement in enforcement of the system. Many vessels rarely
navigate in U.S. waters and Congress has not chosen to enact a license plate system. Id. at
2581 & n. 5. Furthermore, the United States could not require foreign vessels to comply
with a license plate sy~tem since by international agreement each country takes responsibil
ity for regulating its own vessels. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 8, at Art. 5.
125. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111-12 (1965).
126. Vii/a monte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580-82.
127. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (One's reasonable expecta
tion of privacy is the "touchstone" of fourth amendment analysis). See also id. at 361
(Harlan, J., concurring).

1984]

MARITIME EXCEPTION

71

may be viewed during a document and safety inspection; and third,
whether the legitimate objectives of the government to conduct the
boardings were sufficient to justify the resulting intrusion. 128
As to the first factor, people do not normally hop in the family
boat to go to the store. People do not generally use even small plea
sure boats in the same way they use family cars. Ships, therefore,
should not be viewed in the same light as automobiles. The courts
have found the automobile to have special status as a pervasive and
necessary mode of travel,129 Unlike the situation in Prouse, the board
ing of ships for document inspections does not constitute a new en
croachment by the government. Ships and boats have been subject to
document and inspection requirements at least since 1790. 130 Logi
cally, therefore, the expectation of privacy in a vessel is less than that
in the family carPI Another distinction from Prouse exists. The ap
proach of Coast Guard vessels does not generate the fear produced in
the average person unexpectedly stopped or approached by the police.
Recreational boaters and persons familiar with the sea customarily ex
pect and rely on aid from Coast Guard vessels in facing the hazards of
maritime travel. 132 Customs vessels do not have the same lifesaving
mission as the Coast Guard; I33 but the "fear" factor does not rise to
the same level in the maritime environment. Ships are handled differ
ently, moving as they do in waters which are less restricted than city
streets. An approaching customs vessel would look the same whether
its officers intended to board a vessel or merely to continue toward its
destination. Furthermore, because no fixed roadways exist at sea, a
128. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580-82. See also Prouse, 440 U.S. at 656-63.
129. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662-63; State v. Casal, 410 So.2d 152, 155 (Fla. 1982).
130. See supra notes 35, 40-45 and accompanying text.
131. See United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1312 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. de
nied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980); State v. Casal, 410 So.2d 152, 154-55 (Fla. 1982). The sailor's
expectation of privacy is discussed infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text. The special
status accorded a motor vehicle because of its pervasive use is noted in Prouse, 440 U.S. at
662-63.
132. Search and rescue at sea is one of the primary duties of the United States Coast
Guard. 14 U.S.c. § 2 (1982). Compare United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1313
(5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980) (Coast Guard vessel a welcome sight as
distinguished from the fear produced by police officers on land) with Prouse, 440 U.S. at
657 (police approach results in fear), and U.S. v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894 (1975) (approach
of police causes fear). Additionally, officers in charge of all vessels at sea, including cus
toms vessels, are required by law to render aid at sea, and failure to do so constitutes a
felony with a possible maximum sentence of two years imprisonment and a $1000 fine. 46
U.S.C.A. § 2304 (West Supp. 1983).
133. 19 U.S.C. § 1455 (1982) (customs officers' duties do not include search and res
cue); 14 U.S.c. § 2 (1982) (search and rescue at sea is a primary duty of the United States
Coast Guard).
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"roadblock" located offshore would look no different than a random
stop to persons aboard a ship.134
The second factor concerns whether specific parts of the ship
should be protected because individuals possess a legitimate expecta
tion of privacy in private areas. I35 Although an argument exists that a
sailor's ship is his home and that he is entitled to an expectation of
privacy in the whole vessel,136 the more realistic view limits the inter
est to the private areas and living quarters of the vessel. J37 Since the
justification for the inspection is the enforcement of document and
safety regulations, its scope should be limited to viewing those areas
that either contain documents and safety equipment or that must be
viewed to verify the validity of the ship's documents. 138 The crew of a
ship generally has no privacy interest in the cargo hold; 139 the owner
of the vessel has none in those areas which must be viewed to conduct
a document and safety inspection, such as the cabin where documents
134. See United States v. Watson, 678 F.2d 765, 768 (9th Cir. 1982), cerro denied,
103 S. Ct. 451 (1982).
135. See supra note 127. For a discussion of the extent of a document and safety
inspection see supra note II.
136. United States V. Cadena, 588 F.2d 100, 101 (5th Cir. 1979).
137. United States V. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1312-13 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
448 U.S. 906 (1980); United States V. Williams, 589 F.2d 210, 214 (5th Cir. 1979). But see
3 LAFAVE supra note 3, § 10.8(1) at 164-65.
138. United States V. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978), cerro denied, 446 U.S.
956 (1981) further addressed the Coast Guard's authority to conduct warrantless inspec
tions without probable cause on the high seas. Although the issue of the amount of discre
tion authorized by 14 U.S.c. § 89(a) (1982) is beyond the scope of this note, at least the
same amount of discretion would logically be permissible, based on the United States' obli
gation to the rest of the world to enforce international standards of safety and laws aboard
American vessels on the high seas. See infra note 156 and accompanying text. The limita
tion imposed by the requirement to meet the standard substituted by the regulatory scheme
would still exist. Stopping a tanker proceeding at 25 knots far from any border without
some basis of suspicion appears unreasonable. See United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d
1063, 1085-89 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc); United States V. Serrano, 607 F.2d 1145, 1147 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 965 (1980). Courts have held, however, that the Coast
Guard's authority to board and search on the high seas is plenary. See United States V.
Whitaker, 592 F.2d 826, 830 (5th Cir. 1979). United States V. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058,
1064-65 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1981). Since no other nation or
authority may exercise jurisdiction over United States vessels on the high seas, the right to
board and search may be the only practicable means for the United States as a sovereign to
exert sufficient power and control over vessels flying its flag. See supra note 124.
139. United States V. Williams, 589 F.2d 210, 214 (5th Cir. 1979). Mere legitimate
presence in a vessel does not create a fourth amendment privacy interest. Rakas v. l11inois,
439 U.S. 128, 148-50 (1978) (passengers in vehicle lacked standing for a fourth amendment
challenge because they had no expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or under
the seat, and rights of a third person had no bearing on the passengers' rights). See also
United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1312 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906
(1980).
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are stored and the engine room and other compartments which are
required to have safety equipment. 140 Consistent with the basic princi
ple that "the fourth amendment protects people, not places" 141 protec
tion only extends to places in which a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy.142 Logic would not allow invalidation of a
search because law enforcement officers observe a law violation such
as the contraband observed in Vii/amante-Marquez. The ~ett1ed rule
provides that officers making a valid intrusion under a recognized ex
ception to the warrant requirement may seize incriminating evidence
which unexpectedly comes into "plain view."143 The doctrine clearly
applies when an agent properly boarding a vessel to conduct a docu
ment inspection smells burning marijuana and sees bales of marijuana
on deck. l44
The final factor encompasses whether the government's need to
conduct the activity in question is sufficient to justify the intrusion.
The various objectives of the regulatory scheme such as customs en
forcement, vessel safety, and pollution prevention are clearly legiti
mate. 145 Unlike Prouse, the method chosen reasonably effects the
government objective and, as noted above,146 no practical alternatives
to the current inspection requirements exist. 147

3.

The Combination of the Administrative Inspection and the
Border Search Rationales Permit the Maritime
Exception's Broad Grant of Discretion

In applying the fourth amendment balancing test to the maritime
exception, a combination of factors from both the administrative in
spection rationale and the border search doctrine weigh in favor of the
exception's validity. The maritime regulatory scheme meets the the
test of being a pervasively regulated industry; 148 the exigencies of a
140. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. Foreign vessels are also subject
to document requirements and inspections. See supra notes 83-85. For a discussion of the
scope of a document and safety inspection see infra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
141. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
142. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
143. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971).
144. See Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2573, 2577 & n.3.
145. Id. at 2581. See also supra notes 49, 54-59 and accompanying text.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 114-25.
147. In Prouse, the Court found random spot check in question not to be sufficiently
productive so as to justify the intrusion. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659. In contrast, the docu
ment and safety inspection remains the only effective means available in the maritime area.
Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580-81. See supra notes 114-25 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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ship's mobility justify inspections without warrants; 149 and Congres
sional authorization under § 1581(a)lSO stands undisputed. lSI Thus
the Court properly applied the administrative inspection rationale to
the Vil/amonte-Marquez document and safety inspection. Further
more, although the border search doctrine may not be the primary
justification for the document and safety inspections, the customs con
cerns and the ease of border crossings in the maritime area highlight
both the law enforcement agencies' need to inspect and the lack of
viable alternatives. 152 The combination of the two underlying ratio
nales creates a stronger exception, resulting in the maritime excep
tion's broad grant of authority. The grant of broad discretion
"requires caution in fourth amendment analysis, but it is not invaria
bly fatal to the constitutionality of an intrusion."ls3 The long coast
line of the United States and the practical concerns of enforcing the
document and regulatory scheme in the maritime environment dic
tates the need for this broad authority.ls4 Even though the authority
granted by § 1581(a)lSS is broad, however, it is not without
limitations.
IV.

LIMITS OF THE § 1581(A) MARITIME EXCEPTION

The Court in Vil/amonte-Marquez specifically limited its holding
149. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
150. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982). For text of statute see supra note 3.
151. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2578. But see supra note 86 and accompany
ing text.
152. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S.Ct. at 2580-82. Justice Brennan, dissenting, sug
gests that laws controlling maritime smuggling can be adequately enforced by using a "rea
sonable suspicion" standard and cites some successful prosecutions based on cases in which
a "reasonable suspicion" existed. Id. at 2590 n.ll (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Bren
nan's suggestion, however, fails to take into account that violations of the document and
safety regulations often do not generate observable factors which would create a reasonable
suspicion. See 3 LAFAVE supra note 3, § 1O.8(t) at 163-64. Furthermore, he did not con
sider the number and effect of violations which would not be detected if a reasonable suspi
cion standard were adopted. Id.
153. United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1313 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
448 U.S. 906 (1980). Although a broad grant of power to law enforcement officials may
result in some abuses, reason forbids acting on the belief that such power will automatically
be used and abused to the fullest extent possible. Nor are the courts powerless to act upon
any abuses which may occur. Evidence obtained by unreasonable searches may be in
admissable under the exclusionary rule. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). More
over, injured parties may file a claim against the officers themselves. 42 U.S.c. § 1983
(1982). See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (allowing § 1983
claims against federal agents).
154. United States v. 146,157 Gallons of Alcohol, 3 F.Supp. 450, 455-56 (D.N.J.
1933). See also Carmichael, supra note 8, at 101-03.
155. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982).
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to the narrow issue of the boarding of a vessel for a document and
safety inspection. 156 This holding does not permit an overall search of
the vessel. It only allows an inspection which is limited to the cabin
and area where documents are kept, the compartment where the beam
or identification number of the vessel can be verified, and the places
where the safety equipment is required. The beam number is usually
found in the hold of a vessel,157 rather than in the crew or passenger
quarters, so a document inspection does not subject protected privacy
areas to a general search. 158 Additionally, most American pleasure
craft are not federally documented, and bear only a state-issued
number displayed on the exterior of the hull. 159 Neither the statute
nor Vil/amonte-Marquez, therefore, authorizes an overall search of the
vessel. l60 Any search beyond the permissible scope of the document
and safety inspection would be invalid; its fruits would be subject to
the exclusionary rule l61 unless the search can be independently justi
fied otherwise. 162
Finally, the Court's emphasis in Vil/amonte-Marquez on the
ship's ready access to the open sea and the lack of practical alterna
tives implied a limit on the exception. 163 The maritime exception ra
tionale weakens as the vessel moves away from the open sea, thereby
becoming less capable of ocean travel or contact. A reasonable suspi
cion standard seems required, at least where viable alternatives to a
warrantless inspection exist. l64 Ordinarily the further inland a vessel
is, the less likely it made any border crossing or contact. It then fol
lows that the border search justification would receive less weight
156. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2577 n.3.
157. Reply Brief of the United States at 12, Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573.
See also 46 U.S.CA. § 12116 (West Supp. 1983).
158. United States v. Odom, 526 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1976). See also United States v.
Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1312-13, 1315 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980).
159. 46 U.S.CA. § 12305 (West Supp. 1983).
160. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2575, 2577 n.3 (validity of suspicion less
boarding for document inspection was sole issue presented). The authority approved by
Vii/a monte-Marquez is logically limited to the scope of a document and safety inspection.
Id. at 2582 ("type of intrusion made in this case, while not minimal, is limited.") For a
discussion of the scope of a document inspection see supra notes 138-42 and accompanying
text.
161. Mapp V. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
162. Coolidge V. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971). This limitation may not
be significant, however. In small boats a boarding may bring the whole interior of the boat
into plain view, and in larger vessels the extent of safety equipment may allow viewing a
significant part of the ship on a suspicion less basis.
163. See Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580, 2582.
164. See id. See also United States V. Williams, 544 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1977) (war
rantless search of a houseboat held invalid).
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since the government's need to protect itself would not apply.165 The
federal regulatory scheme, however, encompasses many areas such as
navigation, vessel safety, and pollution control which do not depend
on proximity to the border and may properly justify inspection of ves
sels far inland without reliance on the border search doctrine. 166 This
reasoning would indicate that the Court may decide that the landward
limit of the maritime doctrine should be the full extent of the naviga
ble waters of the United States,167 the farthest reach offederal jurisdic
tion over the inland waters.168

V.

CONCLUSION

The intrusion of a short detention of a vessel and an inspection of
its documents and safety equipment is justified under the balancing
test of fourth amendment "reasonableness." The justification rests on
(1) the need for an effective documentation and safety inspection pro
gram to enforce the overall regulatory scheme; (2) the lack of viable
alternatives; (3) the historically broad authority of Congress in regu
lating foreign commerce; and (4) the magnitude of the government's
vital interest in enforcing document requirements, particularly in wa
ters where the threat of smuggling is great. 169 Villamonte-Marquez
established no new powers for law enforcement officers beyond the
authority granted under § 1581 (a),I7° and will probably not affect cur
rent enforcement procedures significantly, if at all. As a strong six to
three decision, however, it removed most of the doubts about the va
lidity of customs and Coast Guard authority for suspicion less board
ings of ships. 171
Should a challenge to the Coast Guard's analogous statutory au
thority, 14 U.S.c. § 89(a),172 arise under similar circumstances, little
doubt exists that the Court would reach a similar decision as long as
the boarding begins properly as a document and safety inspection. 173
165. The border search doctrine is limited to the border or its functional equivalent.
See supra note 73. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 544 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1977).
166. See Vii/amante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2581. See also supra notes 49, 54-59, &
79 and accompanying text.
167. 33 C.F.R. § 2.05-25 (1983) defines the navigable waters of the United States.
168. Id. at § 2.05-30. See also G. GILMORE & c. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMI
RALTY, § 1-11 & n.99 (2d ed. 1975).
169. See Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2582. See also supra notes 78-89 and
accompanying text.
170. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982).
171. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
172. 14 U.S.c. § 89(a) (1982). For the text of § 89(a) see supra note 6.
173. See supra note 138.
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If anything, the rationale for upholding 14 U.S.C. § 89(a)174 is

stronger because of the long-standing recognition of the rights and du
ties of sovereigns concerning their vessels on the high seas.175 Also,
recent Congressional legislation increased Coast Guard authority
against drug smuggling by closing a loophole in its high se~s authority,
thereby indicating continued support of the established objectives and
practices in the drug interdiction effort. 176 As broad as this authority
seems, however, limits exist, particularly in waters well away from
coastal areas. The right of freedom of navigation generally prohibits
stopping foreign vessels on the high seas,177 and the best interests of
the United States favor avoiding disruption of merchant vessel voyages
without some basis of suspicion.
Villamonte-Marquez also reflects the continuing trend of the
Supreme Court in fourth amendment cases of upholding law enforce
ment intrusions in limited areas where it finds sufficient justifications
and safeguards for preventing abuse. 178 In light of this trend, the
Court is not likely to reverse itself on fourth amendment issues. Future
changes in the makeup of the Court by President Reagan more likely
will strengthen the Villamonte-Marquez majority. The maritime ex
ception, therefore, is here to stay. Future litigation in this area will
probably concern only the limitations of the maritime doctrine, not its
validity. 179
Michael J. Devine

174. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1982).
175. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 8, at Art. 5. See 3 LAFAVE, supra
note 3, § 1O.8(f) at 163.
176. Act of Sept. 15, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-350, 94 Stat. 1159 (codified as amended at
21 U.S.c. § 955(a) (1982». This act closed a loophole left by the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat.
1236, which had failed to reenact a prior provision of the drug control laws which made
possession of controlled substances aboard United States vessels on the high seas an offense.
177. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 8, at Art. 2. See also Carmichael,
supra note 8, at 56-65.
178. See generally Bloom, The Supreme Court and its Purported Preference for
Search Warrants, 50 TENN. L. REV. 231 (1983); Note, Warrantless Vehicle Searches and
the Fourth Amendment; the Burger Court Attacks the Exclusionary Rule, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 105 (1982); Note, The Erosion ofProbable Cause: Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1(1968), 13
N.C. CENT. L.J. 212 (1982). See also. e.g.• United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)
(containers within a vehicle subject to a warrantless search may also be searched without a
warrant).
179. But see 3 LAFAVE supra note 3, § 1O.8(f) at 168.

